In Search of a New Balance

After the Failed Talks: Sovereignty, Strategy, and the Unfinished Contest for Global Order

Mubasher Mir

The recent collapse of negotiations between the United States and Iran in Islamabad is not merely a diplomatic setback; it is a revealing moment in the shifting landscape of global power. Beneath the formal language of dialogue and disagreement lies a deeper contest—one shaped by sovereignty, strategic rivalry, and the evolving limits of influence in an increasingly multipolar world.

At first glance, the reasons for failure appear predictable. Long-standing disagreements over Iran’s nuclear program, the persistence of sanctions, and conflicting regional ambitions created a rigid negotiating environment. Yet to reduce the breakdown to these surface issues would be to overlook the broader strategic calculations that defined both sides. These talks were never solely about centrifuges or compliance; they were about positioning, perception, and power.

For the United States, the dialogue served a dual purpose. On one level, Washington sought tangible outcomes—constraints on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and assurances regarding its regional conduct. On another, less visible level, it aimed to assess the durability of its own influence in a region where its dominance is no longer uncontested. The era in which American directives translated seamlessly into global compliance has gradually given way to a more complex reality—one where resistance is organized, alternatives exist, and outcomes are negotiated rather than dictated.

In this sense, the talks were as much a test of hegemony as they were an exercise in diplomacy. Washington entered the room not only with demands but with an unspoken question: how much of its traditional leverage remains intact? The outcome suggests that the answer is far from reassuring.

On the other side of the table, Iran approached the dialogue with a posture shaped by both defiance and calculation. Having endured years of sanctions, isolation, and intermittent military pressure, Tehran has cultivated a strategic culture centered on resilience. The recent confrontation, followed by a fragile ceasefire, appears to have reinforced rather than weakened this mindset. Iran did not come to Islamabad seeking accommodation at any cost; it came to assert its red lines.

Central to these red lines is the principle of sovereignty. For Tehran, demands to abandon or significantly limit its nuclear program are not merely technical issues but questions of national dignity and strategic autonomy. From its perspective, yielding under pressure—particularly in the aftermath of confrontation—would set a precedent that undermines its long-term security. This explains the firmness of the Iranian negotiating position, even in the face of continued economic hardship.

Yet the nuclear issue cannot be fully understood in isolation. It is deeply intertwined with the security concerns of Israel, a key ally of the United States. While Iran may not pose a direct territorial threat to the American homeland, its capabilities and regional posture are viewed in Tel Aviv as existentially significant. Consequently, U.S. policy toward Iran is shaped not only by its own strategic calculations but also by its commitment to Israeli security.

This alignment introduces an inherent imbalance into the dialogue. From Tehran’s vantage point, American demands are not neutral or universally grounded in international norms; rather, they are influenced by a specific regional agenda. This perception—whether entirely accurate or not—erodes trust and narrows the space for compromise. Diplomacy depends not only on the substance of proposals but also on the credibility of those presenting them.

Compounding these tensions is the broader context of great-power competition, most notably the rise of China. Over the past two decades, Beijing has expanded its global influence through economic integration, infrastructure development, and strategic partnerships. Unlike traditional military alliances, China’s approach emphasizes connectivity and long-term interdependence, particularly in energy markets.

Within this framework, Iran occupies a position of considerable importance. As a resource-rich state with a strategic geographic location, it forms a critical link in China’s efforts to secure stable energy supplies and expand its economic footprint. Any instability affecting Iran, therefore, has implications that extend far beyond the Middle East. It intersects with the broader strategic competition between Washington and Beijing—a rivalry that increasingly defines the contours of international politics.

Seen through this lens, pressure on Iran acquires an additional dimension. It is not only about nuclear non-proliferation or regional stability; it is also about shaping the strategic environment in which China operates. Whether this is an explicit objective or an indirect consequence, the effect is the same: heightened tension, shifting alliances, and a more polarized global system.

The failure of the Islamabad talks thus reflects not a single miscalculation but a convergence of structural constraints. Both sides entered the dialogue with entrenched positions and limited flexibility. The United States emphasized compliance, verification, and behavioral change; Iran insisted on sanctions relief, recognition of its rights, and respect for its sovereignty. Between these positions lay a gap too wide to bridge in a single round of negotiations.

Leadership dynamics further complicated the situation. Statements associated with former U.S. leadership during the negotiation period carried a tone that many observers interpreted as coercive rather than conciliatory. While such rhetoric may resonate domestically—projecting strength and resolve—it often proves counterproductive in diplomatic settings. Negotiations require nuance, patience, and the careful calibration of language. Public threats, even if strategically intended, tend to harden positions and diminish the prospects for compromise.

Media narratives on both sides amplified this dynamic. In the United States, coverage frequently framed Iran as intransigent and unwilling to engage constructively. In Iran, media portrayals depicted American demands as illegitimate and reflective of hegemonic arrogance. This mutual reinforcement of adversarial narratives transformed the dialogue into a performance for domestic audiences, where concessions could be politically costly and compromise easily misconstrued as weakness.

Amid these complexities, the role of Pakistan deserves careful recognition. As the host of the talks, Pakistan provided a neutral platform at a moment of heightened tension. Facilitating dialogue between adversaries requires not only logistical capacity but also diplomatic credibility. Islamabad’s ability to bring both sides to the table, even temporarily, represents a meaningful contribution to regional stability.

It is important to emphasize that the failure of the talks does not constitute a failure of Pakistan’s diplomacy. On the contrary, it highlights the inherent limitations of mediation when the principal actors remain unwilling to adjust their positions. A facilitator can create the conditions for dialogue, but it cannot impose agreement. In this regard, Pakistan’s role was constructive, responsible, and worthy of acknowledgment.

The pressing question now is: what comes next?

The immediate priority must be the preservation of the ceasefire. In volatile regions, even minor incidents can trigger disproportionate escalation. Maintaining a fragile peace requires restraint, sustained communication, and a shared recognition of the catastrophic costs of renewed conflict.

Beyond this, there is a clear need for incremental confidence-building measures. History suggests that comprehensive agreements rarely emerge fully formed; they are constructed step by step, through limited understandings that gradually expand the scope of cooperation. Humanitarian exchanges, partial sanctions relief, and technical consultations could serve as practical starting points.

Equally important is the revival of backchannel diplomacy. Public negotiations, while symbolically significant, are often constrained by political visibility and domestic pressures. Quiet, unofficial contacts allow for greater flexibility, enabling parties to explore options without the immediate burden of public scrutiny. In many historical instances, such channels have laid the groundwork for formal agreements.

At a broader level, the United States may need to reassess its approach to complex regional challenges. Strategies heavily reliant on coercion and unilateral pressure have shown diminishing returns in a world where alternative partnerships and emerging power centers provide states with greater strategic autonomy. This does not imply a retreat from global engagement, but rather an adaptation—one that prioritizes diplomacy, multilateralism, and strategic patience over dominance and compulsion.

For Iran, the challenge lies in balancing resistance with pragmatism. While defending sovereignty is a legitimate and deeply rooted objective, prolonged isolation carries significant economic and social costs. Engaging constructively with the international community—without compromising core principles—remains a delicate but necessary endeavor.

Ultimately, the failure of the Islamabad talks underscores a fundamental truth: diplomacy cannot succeed in the absence of trust, and trust cannot be built without a willingness to compromise. Absolute positions, however principled, tend to produce stalemate rather than solutions.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this outcome as the end of dialogue. On the contrary, it reinforces its necessity. Even in failure, negotiations serve a purpose—they clarify positions, expose limitations, and, perhaps most importantly, keep channels of communication open.

The world today stands at a critical juncture. The assumptions of unipolar dominance are steadily giving way to a more contested and complex international order. In this evolving landscape, the management of conflict becomes as important as its resolution. Power must be exercised with restraint, and influence must be grounded in legitimacy rather than coercion.

The Islamabad dialogue may not have produced an agreement, but it has offered a lesson—one that extends far beyond the immediate participants. It is a lesson about the limits of power, the resilience of sovereignty, and the enduring importance of dialogue in an age of uncertainty.

As the dust settles, the choice facing global leaders is stark. They can allow mistrust and rivalry to define the future, deepening divisions and prolonging instability. Or they can invest in the slow, often frustrating process of building a more stable and cooperative international order.

The path they choose will shape not only the trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations but also the broader prospects for peace in an increasingly interconnected and fragile world.

The Romance Still Alive

 The Romance Still Alive

 Mubasher Mir

History, when viewed through the lens of time, often reveals emotions that politics tries to suppress. The relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh—once united as West and East Pakistan—is not merely a tale of separation; it is a story of shared dreams, collective struggle, painful rupture, and, perhaps now, a quiet yet meaningful reconciliation. Beneath the layers of political discord and historical grievances, there remains a subtle but enduring connection—what one might call a “romance” of history, identity, and destiny.

The roots of this relationship stretch back well before 1947, to the historic Partition of Bengal (1905). This event marked a significant turning point for Muslims in the subcontinent. After the failed Indian Rebellion of 1857, Muslims had experienced political marginalization and economic decline. The partition of Bengal, initiated by the British, created a Muslim-majority province in Eastern Bengal, offering a glimpse of political empowerment and administrative inclusion.

However, this move was fiercely opposed by sections of the Hindu elite, who saw it as a threat to their dominance. The reaction to this opposition catalyzed Muslim political consciousness. In 1906, the All-India Muslim League was established in Dhaka—a city that would later become the capital of Bangladesh. This was not a coincidence but a symbolic beginning of a collective Muslim struggle for rights, identity, and ultimately, self-determination.

The early decades of the 20th century witnessed the strengthening of Muslim political unity. Leaders like Muhammad Ali Jinnah and A. K. Fazlul Huq played pivotal roles in shaping this movement. Fazlul Huq, a towering figure from Bengal, presented the historic Lahore Resolution (1940), which laid the foundation for the creation of independent Muslim states in the subcontinent.

The 1946 Indian provincial elections further cemented Muslim political unity, as the Muslim League secured an overwhelming mandate from Muslim-majority areas, including Bengal. This democratic endorsement paved the way for the eventual creation of Pakistan in 1947—a homeland envisioned as a unified state for Muslims, geographically divided but ideologically bound.

Yet, the dream of unity soon encountered the harsh realities of governance, geography, and power dynamics. Despite being numerically larger, East Pakistan often felt politically and economically marginalized. The seeds of discontent began to grow, particularly after the 1954 East Bengal provincial elections, where regional parties defeated the Muslim League, signaling a shift in political sentiment.

The following decades were marked by increasing tensions. Issues of language, representation, and economic disparity deepened the divide. The tragic culmination came in 1971, during the Bangladesh Liberation War, which led to the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state. This was not just a political separation but an emotional rupture—families divided, identities questioned, and a shared history fractured.

For years, the relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh remained overshadowed by mistrust and unresolved grievances. Diplomatic ties were often cautious, and public sentiment carried the weight of historical pain. Yet, history has a way of healing, albeit slowly and imperfectly.

Five decades later, a new generation has emerged—one that is less burdened by the memories of 1971 and more open to redefining the future. In Bangladesh, particularly, the youth have demonstrated a growing awareness of their broader historical roots and regional realities. Recent social and political movements indicate a desire for reform, accountability, and global engagement.

Simultaneously, Pakistan has also undergone its own transformations, grappling with internal challenges while seeking to reposition itself in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. In this evolving context, the two nations are beginning to rediscover common ground.

Trade relations, though still modest, are showing signs of improvement. Cultural exchanges, academic collaborations, and people-to-people contacts are gradually increasing. More importantly, there is a subtle shift in narrative—one that acknowledges the past but does not remain imprisoned by it.

On international issues, Pakistan and Bangladesh often find themselves aligned. Both countries share concerns about climate change, economic development, and regional stability. As members of the Global South, they face similar challenges and opportunities, creating a natural basis for cooperation.

This renewed engagement is not driven by nostalgia alone but by pragmatic considerations. In a world increasingly defined by regional blocs and economic partnerships, collaboration between Pakistan and Bangladesh holds significant potential. With a combined population of over 400 million, the two countries represent a substantial market and a reservoir of human capital.

Yet, the path forward requires sensitivity and sincerity. Acknowledging historical grievances, promoting mutual respect, and fostering trust are essential steps in this journey. The romance of which we speak is not naïve idealism; it is a mature understanding that shared history can be a foundation for future cooperation rather than a barrier.

The metaphor of “romance” is particularly apt. Like any enduring relationship, the bond between Pakistan and Bangladesh has experienced moments of unity, misunderstanding, separation, and rediscovery. It is complex, layered, and deeply human.

Today, as both nations stand at the crossroads of history and opportunity, there is a palpable sense of cautious optimism. The wounds of the past are not entirely healed, but they are no longer as raw. Dialogue is replacing silence, and engagement is gradually overcoming estrangement.

This does not mean that differences have vanished. Political systems, national priorities, and historical narratives still diverge in many ways. However, the willingness to engage despite these differences is itself a significant step forward.

The younger generations in both countries are playing a crucial role in this transformation. Through digital platforms, academic exchanges, and cultural interactions, they are building connections that transcend political boundaries. They are discovering shared languages, cuisines, music, and values—reminders of a common heritage that predates division.

In many ways, this quiet reconnection is more powerful than formal diplomacy. It reflects a genuine desire to move beyond the past while preserving its lessons. It is here that the “romance” truly lives—not in grand  gestures, but in everyday acts of understanding and cooperation.

As we look to the future, the potential for Pakistan-Bangladesh relations is immense. From trade and investment to education and technology, there are numerous avenues for collaboration. More importantly, there is an opportunity to redefine the narrative—to transform a history of separation into a story of reconnection.

The journey will not be easy. It requires patience, vision, and above all, the courage to confront the past without being constrained by it. But if the recent trends are any indication, both nations are moving in the right direction.

The romance, indeed, is still alive. It is no longer the passionate idealism of 1947, nor the tragic heartbreak of 1971. It is something more nuanced—a quiet, resilient bond that has endured the test of time.

In this renewed relationship lies a powerful message: that history, no matter how painful, does not have to dictate the future. That nations, like individuals, can learn, evolve, and rediscover each other.

Pakistan and Bangladesh, once separated by circumstance, now stand with an opportunity to walk together again—not as one state, but as two sovereign nations connected by history, culture, and a shared vision for the future.

And perhaps, in this rediscovery, we find not just political alignment, but a deeper human truth: that some bonds, no matter how strained, are never truly broken.

Blunders Before Bangladesh:

 Blunders Before Bangladesh: 

A Tragic Journey from Promise to Partition

Mubasher Mir

The emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971 was not a sudden historical accident, nor merely the outcome of a single military defeat. It was the culmination of a long chain of political blunders, structural injustices, leadership failures, and missed opportunities that began well before the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Understanding these errors honestly—without denial or excessive self-flagellation—is essential not only for historical clarity but also for building a future based on justice, reconciliation, and regional cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

History does not punish nations for mistakes alone; it punishes them for failing to learn from those mistakes.

Bengal and the Struggle Against British Rule

Bengal was not a peripheral province in the freedom movement of the subcontinent; it was its intellectual and political engine. From Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s reformist ideas to the revolutionary politics of Bengal, Muslims of Bengal played a decisive role in shaping Muslim political consciousness.

The All-India Muslim League, founded in 1906 in Dhaka, drew its earliest strength from Bengal’s Muslim middle class. Leaders such as A.K. Fazlul Huq, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, and Khawaja Nazimuddin were not provincial figures but national leaders of Muslim politics. The Lahore Resolution of 1940, which laid the foundation of Pakistan, was moved by Fazlul Huq—a Bengali leader—symbolizing Bengal’s central role in the Pakistan Movement.

The 1946 Elections: 

A Democratic Mandate Ignored Later

The 1946 elections were a decisive milestone. Muslims across India voted overwhelmingly for the Muslim League, validating its claim as the sole representative of Muslim political aspirations. In Bengal, the Muslim League achieved a sweeping victory, proving that Muslim nationalism was not a fabrication of elite politics but a mass movement.

Ironically, the democratic mandate so fiercely defended against Congress before 1947 was gradually undermined within Pakistan after independence, particularly when it came to East Pakistan. This contradiction would later haunt the state.

Structural Imbalance in the Muslim League Leadership

Despite Bengal’s numerical strength and political contribution, representation of Bengalis in the central decision-making bodies of the Muslim League—especially the Central Working Committee—remained disproportionately low. After 1947, power increasingly concentrated in the hands of West Pakistani elites, civil bureaucracy, and later the military establishment.

This imbalance sowed early seeds of alienation. A state created in the name of Muslim unity began functioning as a centralized system where demographic majority did not translate into political authority.

Post-1947: The Failure of a Just Power-Sharing Formula

At independence, Pakistan inherited profound structural challenges, but none was as critical as the absence of a fair power-sharing arrangement between East and West Pakistan. Despite East Pakistan having a numerical majority, political power, military command, and economic control remained firmly rooted in the western wing.

Revenue generated by jute exports from East Pakistan significantly contributed to national income, yet development spending disproportionately favored West Pakistan. This economic disparity was not merely perceived—it was documented.

The Language Question:

 A Symbol of Deeper Neglect

The language controversy was not an isolated issue; it was a symbol of systemic disregard. The insistence on Urdu as the sole national language ignored the fact that Bengali was spoken by the majority of Pakistan’s population.

The tragic events of February 1952, when students were martyred demanding recognition of Bengali, marked the first bloodshed within Pakistan over internal rights. This moment should have served as a warning. Instead, it became a precursor to deeper alienation.

Absence of a Constitution and Democratic Continuity

One of Pakistan’s gravest failures was the delay in constitution-making. For nine years, the country functioned without a permanent constitution. Political instability, bureaucratic dominance, and the eventual military intervention in 1958 eroded democratic norms.

In 1954, the United Front—a coalition led by Bengali parties—won a landslide victory in East Pakistan. The mandate was not respected. The provincial government was dismissed, reinforcing the perception that democracy was acceptable only when outcomes suited the center.

The Elimination of Moderate Leadership

The assassination of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy in Beirut (1963) removed one of the few leaders capable of bridging the East–West divide. Suhrawardy believed in a federal, democratic Pakistan and enjoyed immense popularity in East Pakistan.

His funeral in Dhaka turned into a massive public demonstration, with slogans reflecting growing anger toward Islamabad. The vacuum left by moderate leadership was gradually filled by more radical narratives.

1965 War: Strategic Myopia and Eastern Vulnerability

During the 1965 war with India, East Pakistan was virtually left undefended. No serious attempt was made to open the eastern front or ensure its security. For Bengalis, this neglect was not merely military—it was psychological.

The perception took root that East Pakistan was expendable, a bargaining chip rather than an equal partner. National unity weakened further.

1970 Elections: The Fatal Democratic Failure

The 1970 general elections offered Pakistan a final constitutional exit from crisis. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League secured an absolute majority in the National Assembly—an unprecedented democratic mandate.

The refusal to honor this mandate proved catastrophic. Political maneuvering, delays, and distrust widened the gulf. What could have been resolved through constitutional negotiation descended into confrontation.

Nationalism vs Federalism: A Missed Strategic Choice

The Awami League’s adoption of the name “Bangladesh” reflected rising Bengali nationalism. While understandable in context, it inadvertently strengthened the establishment’s narrative that the movement was separatist rather than federalist.

Had the demand been framed as the “Republic of East Pakistan,” similar to divided states like Korea or Germany, it might have altered international and domestic dynamics. Nevertheless, this does not absolve the center of responsibility.

1971: Separation with Tears and Trauma

The events of 1971 culminated in separation marked by violence, displacement, and immense human suffering. The tragedy belonged to all—Bengalis, Pakistanis, soldiers, civilians, and martyrs on both sides.

The fall of Dhaka was not merely a military defeat; it was a moral and political collapse.

Five Decades Later: A Moment for Honest Reflection

After five decades, historical narratives within Bangladesh itself are evolving. Political transitions and new elections have reopened debates about governance, history, and identity.

Pakistan, too, has taken steps—however limited—toward reconciliation. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Bangladesh when he was in power and his expression of regret marked a symbolic beginning.

From Regret to Reconciliation: Practical Gestures of Justice

Words alone are insufficient. Concrete steps can transform historical blunders into future benefits:

Offering Fatiha at the graves of the martyrs of 1971, including Nishan-e-Haider Major Muhammad Akram Shaheed, buried in Bangladesh, as well as Bengali civilians who lost their lives.

Resolving property disputes: Properties left behind by Bengalis in Pakistan—particularly in Karachi and other cities—should be legally returned to rightful heirs. Likewise, properties abandoned by Pakistanis in Dhaka, Chittagong, and elsewhere must be addressed through a bilateral framework.

Historical acknowledgment, not selective amnesia, through academic exchanges and joint research initiatives.

A new era of cooperation in trade, education, climate resilience, and regional peace.

Turning Blunders into Benefits

The separation of East Pakistan was not inevitable; it was engineered by cumulative failures. Recognizing this does not weaken Pakistan—it strengthens its moral foundation.

Nations mature not by denying their past but by confronting it with courage and compassion. If justice guides policy and mutual respect shapes diplomacy, the wounds of 1971 can heal into wisdom.

Blunders, when acknowledged, can become bridges. History, if learned, can unite what politics once divided.

Stake Holders at Stake

 Stake Holders at Stake

27th Constitutional Amendment: Reform, Power, and the People at Risk

By Mubasher Mir

With the passage of the Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment by both the Senate and National Assembly, Pakistan has entered a decisive constitutional moment. The government presents the reforms as a path toward greater institutional harmony, national stability and defence modernisation. Yet legal experts, bar councils, provincial parties, and segments of civil society warn that the amendment risks concentrating power, weakening judicial independence, and undermining the federal balance that lies at the heart of Pakistan’s democratic structure.

More importantly — and increasingly voiced across the political spectrum — the real stakeholders of Pakistan are its people, and they are the ones now most at stake. Any constitutional change that reshapes state power must be evaluated primarily through the lens of citizens’ rights, access to justice, and the preservation of democratic accountability.

The amendment revises Article 243 and formally creates the position of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) — a new, constitutionally empowered office that places command of all three services under the Army Chief. The post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) is abolished. The government argues that this will unify defence strategy and remove structural duplication.

Additionally, the amendment provides constitutional recognition for the rank of Field Marshal, allowing an officer promoted to this status to retain rank, privileges and uniform for life. Critics view this as a form of lifetime institutional immunity, beyond the reach of meaningful oversight.

The creation of a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) — tasked with constitutional interpretation, federal-provincial disputes, and inter-governmental conflicts — transfers significant jurisdiction from the Supreme Court. Proponents frame it as a modernisation step; opponents view it as a structural curtailment of the apex court’s historic role as guardian of the Constitution and protector of fundamental rights.

Judges may now be transferred between High Courts by the Judicial Commission. If a judge declines transfer, the refusal may be treated as retirement. Critics fear this may pressure judges and compromise independence by enabling indirect control over judicial careers.

Revisions to financial and administrative frameworks potentially dilute provincial autonomy — a reversal of gains secured through the 18th Amendment. Provincial parties in Sindh in particular describe the 27th Amendment as an attack on federal balance and provincial self-governance.

The government maintains the reforms were long overdue. Officials argue that:

A unified defence structure will strengthen coordination and national security.

A specialised constitutional court will reduce backlog and expedite complex federal cases.

Revised federal arrangements will simplify governance and create clarity.

In theory, these objectives align with global best practices — but only when checks and balances remain intact.

A central critique is that the amendment risks institutionalising impunity.

Democracy requires that no individual or institution stand above accountability. Islam reinforces this principle through the concept of hisab — all authority is accountable, ultimately before God.

Creating lifetime privileges for top military leaders contradicts both democratic and Islamic foundations. Legal scholars warn that constitutionalising such immunity shifts Pakistan toward a model where state power may operate beyond scrutiny.

By diverting constitutional matters from the Supreme Court to the new FCC, the amendment weakens the judiciary’s highest platform for interpreting rights, reviewing executive action, and checking excesses of power.

If judicial appointments or transfers appear influenced by political or executive interests, the entire justice system risks being compromised.

Provincial parties and bar councils from Sindh argue the Amendment undermines the federal compact. They fear that increased centralisation — especially over judicial and fiscal domains — may erode provincial rights enshrined under the 18th Amendment. This could widen existing trust deficits between the federation and smaller provinces.

Democracy is sustained not merely by elections but by the distribution of authority, the independence of institutions and the accountability of office-holders. Any shift that over-weights one institution at the expense of others risks long-term destabilisation.

This crucial observation captures the core issue: the real stakeholders are not political parties, military institutions, or judicial forums — they are the people of Pakistan.

Every constitutional amendment must ultimately answer one question:

Does it protect the rights, dignity, and justice of ordinary citizens?

Today, many fear that this Amendment places those very people — the final custodians of Pakistan's sovereignty — at risk in the following ways:

If the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is curtailed, citizens may lose the strongest platform for constitutional protection.

The public depends on a powerful and independent Supreme Court to defend fundamental rights, overturn injustices, and restrain unlawful authority.

History demonstrates that concentrated power often sidelines public interest. When institutions lose balance, grievances rise, and people feel powerless.

For a democracy like Pakistan — diverse, federal, and complex — concentration of power is particularly dangerous.

When provinces perceive encroachment from the Centre, political tensions filter down to communities.

Public trust is already fragile. Any move that sidelines provincial voices risks widening divisions, inflaming protests and inviting instability.

People’s safety and dignity rely on institutions being accountable.

If top offices become insulated from legal review, citizens may rightly fear that the rule of law could apply unequally — one standard for the powerful, another for the powerless.

Thus, while the Amendment’s architects argue it enhances stability, its real test lies in whether the people feel safer, more empowered, and more confident in state institutions. At present, many do not.

Pakistan now stands at an inflection point. The Amendment could, in an ideal setting, strengthen the architecture of governance — but only if implemented with rigorous transparency, oversight mechanisms, and unconditional respect for judicial independence and provincial autonomy.

Alternatively, if implemented without restraint, it could accelerate institutional imbalance, deepen public alienation and weaken the social contract between state and citizen.

To protect the democratic and Islamic principles of accountability — and to ensure the people remain at the centre of national policy — the following steps are essential:

Appointments, transfers and tenure protections must be insulated from executive or military influence.

The CDF and defence structures must remain accountable to Parliament — the representative body of the people.

The federation cannot thrive without strong and respected provincial institutions. The spirit of the 18th Amendment must be upheld.

Public trust requires clarity. Amendments, appointments and strategic decisions must be transparent, subject to review, and open to public scrutiny.

As the real stakeholders, the people of Pakistan deserve a voice. National dialogue — including bar councils, academic experts, provincial leadership, and civil society — must be institutionalised.

The 27th Amendment may be framed by the government as a step toward institutional harmony, but its implications stretch far deeper. By restructuring defence hierarchy, altering judicial jurisdiction, and modifying federal autonomy, the Amendment touches the core of Pakistan’s constitutional identity.

Islam teaches that all authority is accountable before God. Democracy insists all authority is accountable before the people.

Lifetime immunity and concentrated power violate both.

At this historical moment, it is the people of Pakistan who stand as the true custodians of the Constitution. Their rights, security and justice must remain supreme. Any reform that weakens their position — whether through judicial curtailment, provincial disempowerment or unchecked executive authority — risks endangering the very foundations of the state.

For Pakistan to move forward with stability, dignity and democratic strength, the will, welfare and consent of the people must remain the central guiding principle. Their stake cannot be compromised; their voice cannot be ignored. Only then can constitutional reform truly serve the nation rather than destabilise it.

Privatization of Public Entities: A Sign of Failure or Strategic Adaptation?

 Privatization of Public Entities: A Sign of Failure or Strategic Adaptation?

Mubasher Mir

Privatization—the transfer of ownership or control of public enterprises from the state to private hands—has long been one of the most contested economic reforms in developing countries. Advocates hail it as a tool for efficiency, investment, and fiscal relief; critics condemn it as a confession of failure, where governments admit they can no longer manage their own institutions. In Pakistan’s case, the truth lies somewhere in between: privatization reflects both systemic governance weaknesses and a pragmatic adaptation to fiscal and managerial realities.

From Nationalization to Privatization: A Historical Pendulum

Pakistan’s economic history reads like a pendulum swing between state control and market liberalization. In the 1970s, under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s socialist vision, sweeping nationalization brought banks, industries, and utilities under state ownership. By the early 1980s, more than 200 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated the economy. The intent was social equity, but inefficiency, overstaffing, and political interference soon followed.

By the early 1990s, the tide turned. Facing growing fiscal deficits and pressure from international lenders, Pakistan launched its first major privatization program. The Privatisation Commission of Pakistan (established in 1991) oversaw 132 transactions by 2003, generating roughly Rs 395 billion in proceeds. Yet, as Dawn later noted, few of these divestments produced sustainable improvements. Many privatized entities remained loss-making or were resold amid corruption controversies.

A 2022 study found that Pakistan’s 88 commercially operating SOEs still posted cumulative losses exceeding Rs 730 billion—a staggering drag on the national budget. Even after three decades of privatization, the government continues to pour subsidies into inefficient enterprises. This persistent pattern raises a hard question: has privatization solved the problem, or merely postponed reform?

The Current Drive: A Fiscal Imperative

Privatization has re-entered Pakistan’s economic agenda not as a bold policy innovation, but as a necessity. The country’s fiscal crisis—ballooning debt, IMF conditions, and circular debt in the energy sector—has revived interest in divesting state-owned assets.

In the 2025-26 federal budget, the government projected privatization proceeds of Rs 86.5 billion, nearly ten times higher than the previous year’s estimate of Rs 8 billion. Officials have identified over 50 SOEs slated for sale within the next three to four years, including Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), electricity distribution companies (DISCOs), and large industrial units. Yet, IMF data shows that no major privatization proceeds have materialized since 2019-20, underscoring persistent bottlenecks in execution and political resistance.

The argument for privatization today is largely fiscal: to cut losses, reduce subsidies, and attract foreign investment. According to the Centreline Economic Review, privatizing PIA alone could save Rs 800 billion in debt and eliminate annual subsidies of nearly Rs 300 billion. Similarly, reforming or selling power distribution companies could save an estimated Rs 500 billion annually by cutting theft and inefficiency.

These numbers are compelling. But privatization is not just an economic exercise—it is a political and governance test of the state’s ability to reform responsibly.

The Case for Privatization: Strategic Adaptation and Efficiency Gains

Privatization, when executed under transparent and competitive conditions, can be a strategic adaptation rather than an admission of defeat. It allows governments to focus on core responsibilities—security, justice, education, and infrastructure—while letting market-driven actors manage commercial risks.

 Fiscal Relief and Focus on Core Governance

Pakistan’s SOEs are a massive fiscal liability. Between 2018 and 2023, their cumulative annual losses averaged over Rs 500 billion, while government bailouts and guarantees for these entities further strained public finances. Divesting such enterprises could release fiscal space for health, education, and infrastructure.

The idea isn’t to shrink the state’s moral responsibility but to make it more effective by focusing on governance rather than business. As a 2024 Brookings report observed globally, “privatization succeeds when it enables the state to govern better, not merely to govern less.”

Evidence of Improved Efficiency

Some Pakistani cases demonstrate genuine efficiency gains. The privatization of Karachi Electric (K-Electric), once a chronically loss-making power utility, is a prime example. After privatization, its transmission and distribution losses dropped from 34% to 15%, tax payments increased, and service reliability improved. Despite controversies, the operational turnaround illustrates that private ownership can drive reform—provided regulation is sound.

Similarly, the telecom sector, once dominated by state monopoly PTCL, witnessed explosive growth after liberalization and partial privatization. Mobile penetration surged from under 3 million users in 2001 to over 190 million by 2025. In this sense, privatization catalyzed innovation and accessibility rather than decline.

 Attracting Private Investment

Pakistan’s private sector now accounts for over 80% of total investment in telecommunications, banking, and power. The privatization of banks in the 1990s, including Allied Bank and United Bank Limited, not only reduced fiscal exposure but transformed the financial sector into a more competitive and profitable industry.

When properly managed, privatization is less about giving up control and more about leveraging private capital and expertise for national development.

The Other Side: Privatization as a Confession of Inability

However, Pakistan’s record also offers abundant evidence that privatization often reflects government incapacity rather than strategic evolution.

Weak Governance and Transparency Deficits

A 2002 parliamentary inquiry revealed that nearly Rs 80 billion in privatization proceeds were untraceable, and that several sectors—oil, cement, sugar, and automobiles—had formed private cartels after privatization. Instead of creating competition, ownership simply shifted from public monopolies to private oligarchies.

The Privatisation Commission itself has been criticized for political interference, opaque valuation processes, and inconsistent policy direction. According to a 2025 SouthAsia report, “privatization in Pakistan remains hostage to politics rather than economics,” often stalled by judicial stays, vested interests, and bureaucratic inertia.

 Selling the Sick Without Reform

In many cases, loss-making SOEs are sold off without prior restructuring—effectively transferring the problem rather than solving it. The privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) is instructive. Instead of revitalization, partial privatization failed to deliver promised governance reforms or debt retirement. Workers were retrenched, yet production never recovered. Such outcomes reinforce the perception that privatization serves as a shortcut to avoid administrative responsibility.

 Weak Regulation and Consumer Impact

Where the state retreats, regulation must step in—but in Pakistan, regulators often lack independence or enforcement capacity. The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) struggles to curb collusion among powerful groups, while the SECP, FBR, and SBP face resource and credibility challenges.

The result is rising consumer vulnerability. Whether it’s electricity tariffs, banking charges, or telecom fees, privatized sectors frequently pass inefficiencies and profits onto consumers. In effect, citizens lose twice: as taxpayers funding bailouts, and as consumers facing higher prices.

Political Capture and Conflict of Interest

Privatization has at times blurred the line between policy and patronage. Political influence in appointments, insider bidding, and post-sale benefits for politically connected business groups have marred public trust. Rather than merit-based competition, privatization has too often rewarded proximity to power.

Structural ProblemPrivatization cannot be isolated from Pakistan’s broader governance deficits. Weak institutions—such as the SECP, SBP, and FBR—struggle with enforcement, coordination, and data integrity. Political instability disrupts continuity; every new government revises priorities, halting ongoing transactions.

Moreover, privatization has not always fostered market competition. Instead, it has contributed to the creation of cartels—in sugar, cement, and energy—where a handful of firms dictate prices. The oil cartel of 10 companies, sugar cartel of 24, and cement cartel of 10, identified in early inquiries, exemplify this paradox: private ownership without regulation simply replaced public inefficiency with private exploitation.

The consumer’s position has weakened further as regulatory grip loosened. State oversight diminished while political interference persisted. For ordinary citizens, privatization has often meant higher costs, declining service quality, and vanishing accountability.

A Global Comparison: When Governments Succeed

Interestingly, while Pakistan divests, several advanced economies are re-expanding public ownership. Countries such as Norway, Singapore, and China have strengthened state enterprises with corporate-style governance rather than privatization. Their models emphasize autonomy, merit-based management, and strict accountability—proving that state ownership need not mean inefficiency.

The lesson is clear: the problem lies not in ownership itself, but in governance. A well-governed public enterprise can outperform a poorly regulated private one. Conversely, a weak state cannot regulate even the best-intentioned privatization.

Conclusion: Between Retreat and Reform

In Pakistan’s case, privatization has been both a mirror and a mechanism—a mirror reflecting state weakness, and a mechanism attempting fiscal repair. It reveals a government that often struggles to manage what it owns, yet aspires to modernize through private partnership.

Where privatization has succeeded—telecoms, banking, and K-Electric—it has done so under clear regulation, investment incentives, and public accountability. Where it has failed—steel, airlines, utilities—it has been due to political interference, opacity, and lack of preparatory reform.

Thus, privatization in Pakistan is not inherently a declaration of failure; it becomes one only when mismanaged. The challenge is not whether to privatize, but how—with transparency, regulatory strength, and social safeguards.

If these elements remain absent, privatization will continue to symbolize retreat from responsibility. But if pursued with reformist discipline, it can evolve into a strategic adaptation—an honest recalibration of state and market roles in a country still searching for balance between growth and governance.

Karachi Political Diary

 Karachi Political Diary

 Mubasher Mir

Karachi witnessed two landmark developments this week that signal the beginning of a new era in Pakistan–Saudi Arabia relations — one that goes beyond religious and historical ties to embrace economic growth, technology, and youth empowerment.

A New Phase of Economic Cooperation

Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah hosted Prince Mansour bin Mohammed Al Saud, Chairman of the Saudi–Pakistan Business Council, who led a 30-member high-level business delegation to Karachi.

During the meeting at the Chief Minister’s House, both sides held in-depth discussions on investment opportunities in Sindh’s key sectors — industry, energy, agriculture, and infrastructure.

Murad Ali Shah briefed the delegation on the province’s economic potential, highlighting Sindh’s pioneering success with Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects such as Thar Coal, industrial zones, water supply schemes, and road infrastructure.

He assured that the provincial government offers a transparent, secure, and investor-friendly environment, with simplified procedures for international investors.

Prince Mansour bin Mohammed Al Saud praised Sindh’s progress and emphasized that Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a regional hub for trade and energy. He said Saudi investors are keen to take part in Pakistan’s privatization initiatives and are closely examining opportunities in multiple fields.

Both sides agreed to form joint working groups to accelerate cooperation in priority areas.

A presentation shared with the Saudi delegation noted Sindh’s vital role in Pakistan’s GDP and its immense potential in energy, minerals, agriculture, food processing, tourism, and logistics.

Examples of successful projects with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Engro, and Shanghai Electric were cited as proof of Sindh’s investor-friendly climate.

During the visit, two energy sector MoUs were signed — one related to the sale and purchase of shares in K-Electric Limited, and another establishing strategic cooperation between K-Electric and Trident Energy Limited.

These agreements mark a growing international confidence in Pakistan’s energy market and underline Sindh’s vision for sustainable economic growth.

Youth, Technology, and Sports – A Shared Vision

In a separate event at the Governor House, Sindh Governor Kamran Khan Tessori and Prince Mansour bin Mohammed Al Saud witnessed the signing of two additional Memoranda of Understanding aimed at promoting cooperation in IT education, technology, and sports development.

The ceremony was attended by Saudi Ambassador Nawaf Saeed Al-Maliki, Pakistani Ambassador Ahmed Farooq, Saudi Consul General Mohammed Abdullah Al-Subaie, and other dignitaries.

Under these MoUs, both nations will collaborate on advanced IT education, training programs, youth exchange initiatives, and joint sports events.

Governor Tessori said, “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia share a relationship rooted in brotherhood and mutual trust. These youth-oriented projects will add a new dimension to our partnership.”

He announced that a friendly cricket match between Pakistani and Saudi teams will soon be organized to further strengthen people-to-people ties.

The Governor stressed that education, technology, and sports are essential to a progressive future. “Providing modern education and training to our youth is the government’s foremost priority,” he added.

Prince Mansour commended the Governor’s efforts and said Saudi Arabia recognizes the extraordinary talent of Pakistani youth and will continue practical cooperation for their advancement.

He reiterated that Saudi Arabia is eager to expand its partnership with Pakistan in education, technology, and sports — areas vital to both nations’ future.

A Strategic Alignment

The two Karachi events symbolize a strategic and economic shift in Pakistan–Saudi relations.

For Sindh, they promise fresh investment, economic stability, and employment opportunities, while for Pakistan’s youth, they open doors to education, innovation, and global exposure.

This cooperation reflects a growing synergy between Saudi Vision 2030 and Sindh’s development agenda, representing a shared vision for a modern, progressive, and interconnected future — one where the two brotherly nations translate goodwill into actionable partnership.

Political Calm in the Making

Meanwhile, in a separate development, a high-level political meeting took place in Nawabshah, where President Asif Ali Zardari met with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, National Assembly Speaker Ayaz Sadiq, and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi.

According to the Presidency, the meeting reviewed the country’s political, security, and regional situation in detail. Ishaq Dar briefed the President on his recent United Nations General Assembly engagements and meetings with world leaders.

Sources said the discussion also focused on reducing political tension between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The government team conveyed the Prime Minister’s special message, emphasizing dialogue and mutual understanding as the only path forward.

It was decided that both parties will resolve differences through consultation and that the federal government will address PPP’s concerns without delay. Coordination between Sindh and Punjab governments will also be restored to strengthen administrative and development cooperation.

Leaders agreed to avoid controversial statements and promote a political climate of reconciliation and cooperation.

Observers describe the meeting as an important confidence-building step between the federal and provincial leadership, raising hopes for political stability and continuity of democracy.

Afghan Refugee Movements from Karachi

Amid growing Pakistan–Afghanistan border tensions, reports have emerged suggesting the departure of Afghan refugees from Karachi. However, official confirmation regarding the number of returnees and specific localities remains pending.

Conclusion

From economic diplomacy with Saudi Arabia to political reconciliation at home, the past week in Karachi has underscored Pakistan’s broader shift toward strategic cooperation, political maturity, and regional engagement.

If these initiatives sustain their momentum, Sindh could soon become a model of foreign investment and youth-led progress, while Pakistan stands to benefit from renewed unity and global confidence.

Political Diary Karachi

 Political Diary Karachi

Mubasher Mir

The recent Solidarity Gaza March on Karachi’s Shahrah-e-Faisal has once again demonstrated that the people of Pakistan stand firmly with the Palestinian cause. The turnout was massive, emotional, and politically meaningful, reflecting that for ordinary Pakistanis, Palestine is not a distant issue but an existential one tied to Muslim identity and global justice.

The message was crystal clear: Israel remains unacceptable, the “two-state solution” is a non-starter, and Hamas is viewed as the true face of Palestinian resistance.

Gaza and the Pakistani Conscience

The highlight of the march was the speech of Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer Hafiz Naeem-ur-Rehman, who recalled the historic words of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, declaring that Pakistan would never recognize Israel. His bold demand that Pakistan open a Hamas office within its territory exposed the sharp gap between public sentiment and state policy.

The ordinary people of Pakistan, alongside political workers across divides, align themselves with the martyrs, children, and women of Gaza. The state, however, remains silent, bound by American influence and diplomatic compulsions.

A striking aspect of the rally was the participation of leaders from different political and sectarian backgrounds. This underlined that the Palestinian cause transcends party lines and unites the Muslim Ummah. Speakers pointedly criticized the paralysis of the United Nations and the monopoly of the United States, which have left Palestinians trapped in a cycle of oppression.

Notably, the marchers also condemned the Abraham Accords, singling out Arab governments attempting to normalize ties with Israel. Pakistanis, once again, made their position unambiguous: they will not support any deal that sidelines Palestinian resistance or legitimizes Israel.

But here lies the test: Can Pakistan’s rulers translate this public passion into actual policy?

Beyond Slogans: Steps Pakistan Must Take

Mass rallies and fiery speeches are important but insufficient. What Pakistan needs is policy backed by action:

1. Diplomatic and material aid for the Palestinians must be increased.

2. A joint Islamic bloc strategy must be pursued to pressurize Israel internationally.

3. Pakistan’s historic and ideological stance must not be diluted under foreign pressure.

At a time when Palestinians are surrounded by death and destruction, Pakistan’s solidarity is praiseworthy. Yet the real challenge is for the state: will it choose bold, principled leadership, or remain paralyzed by expediency?

Karachi: The Neglected Lifeline

While Karachi stood for Gaza on the streets, its own story is one of deep neglect. At a Pakistan Business Forum roundtable, former Finance Secretary Younis Dagha revealed shocking numbers: Karachi has been denied Rs 3,360 billion in the 15 years since 2010. Funds that could have modernized infrastructure and completed essential projects like K-4 water supply, Circular Railway, BRT systems, and road networks never reached the city.

The figures tell a damning story. Of Pakistan’s Rs 12,500 billion federal budget, a colossal Rs 8,000 billion comes from Karachi, while the rest of the country contributes only Rs 4,500 billion. Despite being the economic engine—through industries, ports, exports, and taxes—Karachi remains crippled by broken roads, water shortages, power failures, and outdated transport.

One question dominates: If Karachi generates 67 percent of the country’s revenues, why is it left in ruins?

The answer lies in systemic misgovernance. The Sindh government under the PPP has presided over a ballooning provincial budget, from Rs 450 billion to Rs 3,500 billion in 15 years. Yet the KMC budget remains stuck at Rs 25 billion, leaving Karachi starved.

Opposition Leader Saifuddin Advocate summed up the decay: under Mayor Naimatullah Khan, even a union committee chairman could build all roads in his constituency; today, getting a single road repaired is a monumental task. Resources exist, but priorities and honesty do not.

The injustice to Karachi is not local—it sabotages Pakistan’s national economy. Without modern infrastructure, water, and transport projects, Pakistan cannot achieve sustainable growth.

What Karachi Needs

Rs 880 billion annually, its fair share, must be allocated.

Port and octroi revenues should be reinvested directly in the city.

Local governments must be empowered financially and administratively.

Above all, transparency is vital to prevent corruption from devouring development funds.

Karachi is not merely Sindh’s capital—it is Pakistan’s economic backbone. To weaken it is to undermine Pakistan itself. If policymakers continue their apathy, public trust will collapse, and even the integrity of the state may face erosion.

Water Disputes and Federal Trust

Another brewing storm is the federal water dispute. Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz’s recent remarks on a controversial canal project ignited backlash from the PPP Sindh, which termed her statements a violation of the Council of Common Interests (CCI) decision.

According to PPP Sindh President Nisar Khuhro, the project had already been unanimously rejected by the CCI, making Maryam’s words unconstitutional and damaging to federal trust. Sindh’s long-standing fear is that Punjab seeks dominance over Indus waters, leaving tail-end Sindh vulnerable.

Khuhro reminded that Nawaz Sharif himself shelved divisive projects like the Kalabagh Dam to preserve national unity—insight Maryam appears to lack.

Here arises a critical question: Were Maryam’s remarks mere rhetoric for provincial politics, or an early outline of government policy? If it is the latter, Pakistan could face serious provincial confrontation.

The PPP has also accused the Punjab government of mishandling flood relief, alleging deliberate cuts that saved elite properties while drowning poor farmers. If substantiated, this would be not only mismanagement but outright social injustice.

The Punjab government must come clean: how much aid was allocated, from what sources, and how transparently it was distributed. Without facts, political accusations will continue to erode trust.

The Need for Trust and Constitutionality

Pakistan’s federation rests on trust, fairness, and adherence to constitutional forums. The CCI exists to ensure equitable resource allocation. If provincial governments defy its authority, the result will be discord and weakened national cohesion.

Maryam Nawaz and Punjab must respect institutional decisions and avoid statements that inflame sensitivities. At the same time, the PPP should avoid exploiting such issues for political mileage and instead propose constructive solutions.

Conclusion: Three Fronts, One Test

From Gaza solidarity, to Karachi’s deprivation, to water disputes, Pakistan faces challenges that are deeply interconnected. Each represents a test of leadership, principle, and governance.

On Palestine, Pakistan must move beyond slogans and take principled diplomatic steps.

On Karachi, justice in resource allocation and governance reform is essential for economic stability.

On water disputes, constitutional forums and provincial trust must be protected at all costs.

The lesson is simple: Pakistan cannot afford expediency. Whether in foreign policy or domestic governance, principled stands and transparent action are the only path to restore public trust and safeguard the federation.